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Generations of commentators have examined (and critiqued) standing doc-
trine. The fiercest clash has turned on the question of "injury "-specifically,
what type of grievance is sufficient to merit court consideration. Defining "in-
jury" is no easy task, and in recent years, substantial inquiry has focused on just
what harms hould qualify an individual as "injured " Subjectivefear? Lost aes-
thetic enjoyment? Increased risk of death? And so on.
Surely, these debates are of great importance. Yet up to this point, judges
and scholars have almost all assumed an "injury binary ": either an individual
has received a hurt sufficient to qualify for standing, or she has not.
This Note rejects this binary, and instead argues for a third path: 'frac-
tional injury. " A fractional injury is one that, if manifest in a lone individual,
would be insufficient to grant standing. Should multiple individuals experience
this injury and band together as a group to demand relief however, then their
collective grievance would be sufficient to merit standing. The upshot of this ap-
proach would be a class of injuries for which 'fractional standing "-the stand-
ing of the united fractions-would be recognized.
This Note offers the first systematic exploration-and efense-of frac-
tional standing. After briefly reviewing existing standing doctrine, the Note pro-
ceeds to illuminate the current "standing binary" and identify courts and com-
mentators who have already gestured toward a notion of 'fractional standing."
Here, I highlight several real-world cases, such as the D.C. Circuit's prominent
ruling in Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. E.P.A and the Supreme
Court's decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International.
Ultimately, though, my aim is less descriptive than normative, and so the
balance of the Note argues that, irrespective of their current status, fractional
injuries should be recognized going forward. Specifically, I argue that fractional
standing would vindicate the core purposes of standing doctrine's injury require-
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ment-ensuring effective legal advocacy, dispensing constitutional justice, mar-
shaling scarce resources, and preserving the constitutional separation powers. I
also assess and respond to several important objections.
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Standing-the question of "who" may access courts and "when" they may
do so'-is an inquiry academic commentators deem "immensely powerful."
'2
Few questions are as central to standing as the issue of "injury," the determina-
tion of whose grievances are sufficient to merit court consideration. Defining
"injury" is no easy task3 and, in recent years, substantial inquiry has focused on
just what harms should qualify an individual as "injured." Subjective fear?4 Lost
aesthetic enjoyment?5 Increased risk of death?
6
Surely, these factors are of great importance. Yet, to this point, judges and
scholars have almost all assumed a standing binary: either an individual has re-
ceived a hurt sufficient to qualify for standing, or she has not.
At times, though, courts and commentators have hinted at a possible third
option: "fractional injury." A fractional injury is one that, if manifest in a lone
individual, would be insufficient to grant standing. Should multiple individuals
experience this injury and band together as a group to demand relief, however,
then their collective grievance would be sufficient to merit standing. The upshot
of this approach would be a class of injuries for which "fractional standing"-
the standing of the united fractions-would be recognized.
1. Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1363 (1973).
2. Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 727, 727
(2009).
3. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (noting that the concept is "not sus-
ceptible of precise definition").
4. See Brian Calabrese, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 68 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1445 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (recognizing that "aes-
thetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of
life in our society," and thus diminishment of these interests would generally be sufficient to grant stand-
ing).
6. Susan W. Schillaci, Increased Risk of Future Harm As Injury in Fact: Expanding or
Eroding Standing?, 10 QUtNNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1 (2006).
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This Note offers the first systematic exploration-and defense--of frac-
tional standing.7 In Part I, I offer an overview of existing standing doctrine. I first
provide a brief look at standing doctrine as it operates in the United States. In
doing so, I highlight four structural aims that current standing doctrine priori-
tizes: ensuring effective legal advocacy, marshaling scarce judicial resources,
preserving the separation of powers, and dispensing justice to litigants. I con-
clude Part I by highlighting the "injury binary"-the assumption that an individ-
ual litigant is either injured (and thus worthy of court access) or uninjured (and
thus not).
Part II, however, introduces a different conception: the notion of "fractional
injury." Once again, fractional injuries are those that, if manifest in an individual,
would be insufficient to warrant standing, but if manifest in a group of individu-
als, would be sufficient. Here I observe that even in systems that espouse the
"injury binary," courts have gestured toward a notion of "fractional standing"
already in practice.
Ultimately, though, my aim is less descriptive than normative. In the bal-
ance of Part II, I argue that, irrespective of their current status, fractional injuries
should be recognized going forward. Specifically, I argue that fractional standing
would advance the core interests of the standing doctrine's injury requirement:
ensuring vigorous and efficacious legal advocacy, marshaling the judiciary's
limited resources, preserving the separation of powers, and ensuring that litigants
receive justice. I also assess and respond to several important objections. Part III
offers brief conclusions.
Before proceeding, a clarification is in order: this Note is not meant as a
doctrinal argument that current precedent requires (or even permits) fractional
standing. Instead, my claim is a normative and functional one: irrespective of
current doctrine, recognizing "fractional standing" would better satisfy the aims
of judicial inquiries into standing. Thus, while I believe modem standing doc-
trine plausibly supports my approach,8 this conclusion is unnecessary to my cen-
tral argument.
I. Standing Today
Before beginning, we must survey existing standing doctrine. This Part of-
fers a brief look at standing doctrine as it operates in the United States. In doing
so, I highlight four structural aims that the injury requirement of contemporary
standing doctrine is said to vindicate: effective advocacy of legal positions, en-
suring judicious use of scarce court resources, maintaining the separation of pow-
7. As will be seen in Part 11, while several scholars have noted the idea in passing, few
have discussed it in any detail, and those who do generally reject it. See infra note 50.
8. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing's Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283,
1320-21 (2013) (arguing that Article Ill's "injury in fact" standing is broad enough to extend to "proba-
bilistic harm").
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ers, and ensuring all litigants have access to justice. This Part closes by high-
lighting the "injury binary," the assumption that an individual litigant is either
injured (thus, worthy of court access) or uninjured (thus, not).
To have standing in American courts, a litigant must establish a genuine
"case" or "controversy" under Article III of the Constitution. A "case" or "con-
troversy," in turn, includes three key elements: (1) a litigant has suffered an in-
jury (commonly known as "injury in fact"), (2) that injury was caused by the
defendant (that is, it is "fairly traceable"), and (3) it is within the courts ability to
grant redress ("redressability").9
While superficially simple, this structure has engendered fierce contro-
versy.1 ° The bulk of the dispute regards the first prong of the test, which forms
the central focus of this Note: the "injury in fact" requirement.1 To wit, recent
prominent cases decided by the Supreme Court have turned on whether fears of
government spying are "injuries" (the Court said no),12 whether expenditures
made to protect organic seeds from a risk of genetic contamination are "injuries"
(the Court said yes),'3 and whether the predicted harms of climate change are
"injuries" (the Court gave a qualified yes).'4
Yet to fully understand the injury requirement, we must turn from how to
why. What are the purposes the injury requirement of standing doctrine aims to
achieve? Why not allow any person, at any time, to challenge legal wrongs?5
While the question is contentious, courts and commentators have repeatedly em-
phasized four priorities. First, the injury requirement is said to improve the qual-
ity of legal advocacy, leading to superior results. In part, this is based on the
9. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Of course, even if all three elements are present, courts may still deny standing
for "prudential" reasons, such as the need for judicial efficiency. Bradford Mank, Standing and Global
Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L.J. 1, 28 (2005). That said, prudential reasons-
unlike the tripartite constitutional test-are less formidable restrictions, and may be overridden by con-
gressional action. Richard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule ofAccess for a Rule of Defer-
ence, 60 ADMtN. L. REV. 943, 952 (2008). Such limits are not explored in detail in this Note.
10. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1061, 1061-62 (2015); Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, lI, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foun-
dation and Taxpayer Standing, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2008); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Stand-
ing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 614 (2004); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts
Court in Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 885 (2008).
11. Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1668
(2007) (calling injury the "central, and most controversial, component of Article Ill standing"). Because
of injury's central importance, the other two prongs of the test for constitutional standing-traceability
and redressability-will not be explored in detail in this work.
12. Clapper v. Amnesty int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
13. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010).
14. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523.
15. Notably, this is the case in democracies like South Africa and Israel that feature
actio popularis: the ability of any citizen, at any time, to lodge a constitutional complaint. See S. AFR.
CONST., 1996, art. 38 (stating that "anyone acting in the public interest" may "approach a competent court,
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened."); AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE




assumption that a party who has received an injury will advocate more vigor-
ously than one whose interest is merely intellectual or theoretical.16 In part, this
also stems from the belief that, when a controversy has manifested itself in the
real world, this allows judges to make more accurate and informed decisions than
they would with a purely hypothetical problem. 7
A second rationale for the injury requirement is the preservation of scarce
judicial resources. Because courts and judges have limited time, the injury re-
quirement creates an order of priority, ensuring that jurists spend their time on
those disputes in which real people have something tangible on the line. '8
A third rationale for the injury requirement is the principle of separation of
powers. The separation of powers argument begins from the premise that
judges-particularly unelected judges-are less democratically accountable than
other government organs such as legislatures.9 Recognizing this fact, it is seen
as important that courts use their power to overturn democratic decisions as ju-
diciously and sparingly as possible.2" The injury requirement, in this view, use-
fully restricts courts' power to certain legal disputes. Absent this check, critics
fear courts would have an unlimited jurisdictional range and, as a result, a vast
and inappropriate amount of power. Relatedly, some also suggest that, without
the constraints of standing, courts would gain disproportionate power over the
national executive, since they could use judicial fiat to mandate how the execu-
tive spends scarce "enforcement" resources.
21
Finally, commentators have noted that the first three goals of injury stand-
ing doctrine must be balanced against a fourth: ensuring that harms can be effec-
tively redressed, and that justice is done.22 Thus, even as they aim to screen out
16. Nash, supra note 8, at 1328-29.
17. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that the "gist of the ques-
tion of standing" is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions"). For a classic
exposition of this view, see Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002
(1924).
18. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 191 (2000); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article IIl Standing to "Accidental " Plaintiffs: Lessons
from Environmental andAnimal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1,3 (2010).
19. John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements ofArticle
IIIAdjudication, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Heather Elliott, The Functions
of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of
Powers Analysis, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 37, 43 (1984).
21. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiability, 86 TEx. L. REV. 73, 101 (2007).
22. See, e.g., Matt Handley, Why Crocodiles, Elephants, andAmerican Citizens Should
Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Standing to Sue, 21 REV. LITIG. 97, 98-99 (2002); Jon
Owens, Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition for Redress for the Environment, 7 ENVTL.
LAW. 321, 377 (2001); Justin R. Pidot, The Invisibility ofJurisdictionalProcedure andlts Consequences,
64 FLA. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2012); Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege,
System Justification, and the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 122
(2011).
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frivolous or irrelevant petitions, injury requirements should also be tailored to
ensure that those who have been harmed receive their day in court.
Of course, whether or not the injury requirement actually satisfies these
(sometimes competing) goals is deeply controversial. For every scholar who
claims that a personally-experienced injury is required to generate sharp advo-
cacy,23 there is one who argues that pure intellectual interest would be more than
adequate to meet this end.24 For every scholar who claims the injury requirement
is a vital check on judicial overreach,25 there is one who sees the "separation of
powers" argument as a red herring.26 Yet in principle, each of these four goals is
"eminently reasonable,"27 and to the extent that our concept of injury does
achieve them, it is to be respected.
Up to this point, I have highlighted features of standing doctrine's injury
requirement that have been the focus of substantial academic exploration. Yet
there is one feature of the injury requirement hat is seldom explicated: the injury
binary. Simply put, today's standing doctrine creates two starkly separate cate-
gories. On one hand, those victim to a recognized "injury"-however slight-
are granted court access. Thus, under the "identifiable trifle" principle,28 one who
is defrauded of even one cent is entitled to court access.29 On the other hand,
those who fall victim to an unrecognized injury are categorically barred from the
court. For instance, one may be intellectually disgusted at racial segregation, but
intellectual disgust has not been recognized as an "injury." Absent some other
sort of harm, this challenge to segregation will never be heard.
30
As even this brief discussion suggests, the question of where the boundary
line between injury and non-injury should rest remains uncertain.3 1 Moreover,
given the broad nature of determining precisely what "injury" means, many
charge that the current doctrine permits judges to act arbitrarily to correct harms
they deem legitimate.32 Yet, although these debates are crucial, they have failed
for the most part to challenge the underlying binary. At day's end, either an in-
dividual has full standing, or she does not.
23. E.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 55, 65 (2012).
24. E.g., Siegel, supra note 21, at 88-89.
25. E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Sep-
aration of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881-82 (1983).
26. E.g., Murphy, supra note 9, at 974.
27. Staudt, supra note 10, at 613.
28. Hessick, supra note 23, at 72.
29. Of course, given litigation costs, the chances that an individual litigant would pursue
such a suit are quite low. However, with aggregation devices like class action suits, such "trifles" can add
up quite quickly. See generally WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, I NEWBEM ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed. 2011).
30. E.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (denying standing to two white liti-
gants who, on the basis of ideological disgust, challenged segregation in Cairo, Illinois).
31. For a brief sampling of this debate, see Calabrese, supra note 4; William A. Fletcher,
Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277 (2013); Miles L. Galbraith, Com-
ment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standingfor Data Security Breaches of
Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1365 (2013).
32. Harrison, supra note 19, at 1368.
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11. Toward Fractional Standing
Up to this point, I have outlined the modem structure of standing doctrine.
I have also outlined the notion of the "injury binary": discrete individuals are
either injured, or they are not. In this Part, however, I suggest that in some in-
stances, courts and commentators have gestured toward a third option: recogniz-
ing fractional injury.
This Part first aims to highlight how courts and commentators have already
hinted at this possibility. After offering this descriptive material, I advance a nor-
mative case for why, irrespective of current doctrine, courts ought o recognize
fractional standing. Specifically, I argue that fractional standing serves the afore-
mentioned core interests of the injury requirement of standing doctrine, and I
assess and respond to several important objections to adopting fractional stand-
ing.
A. Hints of Fractional Injury
To date, the injury binary has been a largely unquestioned and unchallenged
assumption. Yet, beneath this veneer, several courts and commentators have al-
ready suggested the possibility of fractional standing.
The first and most obvious example of currently existing fractional standing
comes in the doctrine of associational standing. Under American law, associa-
tions, such as voter rights groups, may be granted standing under one of two
circumstances. First, and less important for our purposes, an association has
standing to challenge attacks on its structure as an organization. For example, if
Congress passed a law banning Muslim groups from incorporating as non-prof-
its, an incorporated association of imams would have standing to challenge the
legislation as unconstitutional.33 Second, and more important for our purposes,
an association can sometimes bring suit on behalf of its individual members.
Courts grant such associational standing whenever:
(1) [an] association member would have standing to sue individually;
(2) the interests asserted are germane to the organization's purpose; and
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members.
34
As this scheme suggests, "representational" standing is ostensibly granted
only when at least one individual association member herself has standing, mean-
ing that individual has already been "injured." Accordingly, associational stand-
ing seems at first to be merely another form of the injury binary.
33. See Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1225 (2014)(describing
associational standing doctrine).
34. John C. Yang, Standing. .. in the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1356, 1362 (1991).
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As applied, however, the doctrine of associational standing has ometimes
operated in ways that seem quite similar to fractional standing. The most striking
example of this came in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' (well publicized)
flirtation with probabilistic standing in National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) v. EPA.31 In this case, the NRDC (a large environmental rights organi-
zation) brought suit on behalf of its members to challenge a new EPA ozone
standard. As is required for all associational standing complaints, the NRDC al-
leged that its individual members had been harmed by the policy (e.g., by an
increased risk of cancer). Rather than identify any particular harmed individuals,
however, the organization instead looked to the "law of large numbers." Specif-
ically, the NRDC argued that, since it had roughly 490,000 members,3 6 and the
increased risk of cancer from the ozone policy was roughly one in 100,000, 37 the
policy could be expected to eventually cause cancer in at least several group
members.38 Accordingly, the association reasoned, via statistics, that it had sat-
isfied the standing requirement.
Initially, the D.C. Circuit rejected this claim, holding, among other things,
that the NRDC had failed to identify any particular member who had been injured
and so warranted standing.39 On rehearing, however, the court reversed course,
specifically noting that:
The lifetime risk that an individual will develop nonfatal skin cancer as a result of EPA's rule
is about I in 200,000 by the intervenor's lights. Even ifa quantitative approach is appropriate-
an issue on which we express no opinion-this risk is sufficient to support standing. One may
infer from the statistical analysis that two to four of NRDC's nearly halfa million members will
develop cancer as a result of the rule. 
40
There is much about this decision that is striking.41 Yet one of the most interest-
ing implications, as Professor Heather Elliott has suggested, is that the D.C. Cir-
cuit's ruling effectively supported fractional standing by signaling that large or-
ganizations can aggregate fractional risks to establish standing, even if an
individual or small association would be unable to meet this threshold in the same
scenario.42 Put differently, the one-in-100,000 increased risk of cancer inflicted
on each NRDC member might not have been sufficient o grant any individual
35. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, withdrawn, 464 F.3d I (D.C. Cir.
2006) [hereinafter NRDC 1].
36. Id. at 482.
37. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter NRDC
1ll.
38. Id.
39. NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 484.
40. NRDC 11, 464 F.3d at 7.
41. For commentary on the ruling, see Elliott, supra note 20, at 504-05; and Robin Kun-
dis Craig, Removing "'The Cloak ofa Standing Inquiry ": Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private
Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 201 (2007).
42. Elliott, supra note 20, at 506.
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member standing, but collectively the "two to four" cancer cases were enough to
open the courthouse door.
43
To be sure, the D.C. Circuit's cumulative approach is far from universal,
with different circuit courts adopting different views of such "probabilistic stand-
ing."'44 Moreover, at least some commentators suggest that the Supreme Court
subsequently rejected the NRDC approach.45 Nevertheless, as NRDC shows, rul-
ings that sound in the realm of fractional standing are already upon us. And in
any case, even the classic concept of associational standing evinces shades of
fractional standing. After all, the larger an organization is, the greater its odds
are of having at least one member in the "right place at the right time" to qualify
as personally injured. This suggests that, even in the status quo, an organization's
access to the courts can turn significantly on the size of its membership.
Moreover, beyond associational standing, and even when harms are not so
neatly quantified, courts often talk in ways that suggest an intuitive form of"frac-
tionalization" is at work. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,4 6 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court considered whether a group of journalists and human
rights lawyers who had jointly sued to challenge government surveillance policy
should be granted standing. The majority rejected their plea. In a dissenting opin-
ion, however, Justice Breyer noted that, among the group of journalists, there
was a high chance that the government was "intercepting at least some of their
private, foreign, telephone, or e-mail conversations.'47 Such framing readily sug-
gests a "fractional"-type approach. As the pool ofjournalists and lawyers grows,
the pool from which "some" communications might be captured would appear
to grow as well. By contrast, had only a single journalist alleged spying, it seems
unlikely that the minority would have been so receptive to the plaintiffs' claims.
Thus, even in cases where harms are not easily quantified, the sheer amount of
plaintiffs seems to exert an intuitive-if subtle-pull.
As I have noted, the mine run of academic commentary has overlooked
these suggestions, instead viewing these cases from a binary stance. Commenta-
tors like Amanda Leiter, for example, argue that in cases like NRDC there should
be no minimum level of risk that an individual must experience to gain stand-
ing.48 Under this view, the NRDC should have been granted standing not because
43. Id. at 505 n.222 ("lilt seems unlikely that the D.C. Circuit, in the NRDC case, would
have reached the same conclusion had the case been brought by a much smaller organization. For example,
an environmental group with 10,000 members could show only that it had one-twentieth of a member who
would likely die from the methyl bromide rule, arguably insufficient for standing.").
44. Interesting examples of this phenomenon are detailed in Bradford Mank, Standing
and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 668-69 (2009).
45. E.g., Michelle Fon Anne Lee, Surviving Summers, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381 (2010).
But see Nash, supra note 8, at 1295-97 (arguing that probabilistic standing possibilities have survived
recent Court rulings).
46. 133 S. Ct. 1138(2013).
47. Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
48. Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing Thresh-
old, 97 GEO. L. J. 391 (2009).
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of aggregate probability, but rather because each and every one of its members
had received an "identifiable trifle" of risk sufficient to justify standing.49 Such
critiques are important, but they remain within the binary framework. Another
path, however, is possible.
50
B. The Case for Fractional Standing
To this point, we have surveyed the field of "fractional standing" as it ap-
pears to manifest today. At times, as in NRDC, fractional injury seems explicitly
embraced, with courts granting standing precisely because so many members al-
leged an injury at the same time. At other times, as in Clapper, the suggestion is
subtler and more qualitative: as more people join the pool, there seems more
reason to grant court access. Yet even if fractional standing has yet to gain cen-
trality-indeed, even if current precedent did not evince this concept-it is an
idea that deserves a more serious assessment than critics have provided. This
Section first sketches what a fractional standing regime might look like; it then
makes the case for fractional standing.
1. An Approximate Model of Fractional Standing
What would a "fractional standing" jurisprudence look like? At the outset,
it is important to note that not all injuries need be broken into fractions. Indeed,
for the bulk of traditional legal actions, our current categories of "fully injured"
and "no injury" would retain great utility. Thus, even if fractional standing were
embraced, courts would still be free to grant standing to anyone who has been
physically assaulted (however slightly), while denying standing to anyone who
is merely ideologically concerned (however sad they are).
Between these poles, however, would exist a new category: fractional inju-
ies. What would these injuries be? Here we may begin from the current concept
of injury. In a "rough and ready" way, the current decision calculus regarding
when an "injury" occurs seems to turn on two variables: (1) the probability of
the harm and (2) the severity of the harm. On the first count, courts show greater
leeway in granting standing for more certain events than less certain ones, with
all courts holding that, unless some minimum degree of likelihood is satisfied,
standing cannot be granted.51 On the second count, even if an event is not certain
to occur, courts have suggested that, when threatened harm is severe (such as
49. Id. at 406.
50. Those few commentators who have more directly addressed the prospect of some-
thing like fractional standing have apparently condemned it. For her part, Heather Elliott bemoaned the
"curious aspect" that rulings like NRDC might reach different conclusions about standing depending on
the size of the suing organization. Elliott, supra note 20, at 505 n.222. Bradford Mank echoes Elliot's
approach (and cites her work), describing the NRDC court's fractional approach as a "problem." Mank,
supra note 44, at 722-23.
51. E.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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death or dismemberment), even a relatively uncertain chance might be sufficient
to constitute injury.
52
Building on this simple calculus, one might imagine fractional standing to
operate along two distinct dimensions of cases: (1) cases where low probabilities
could be combined into sufficiently high chances of harm, and (2) cases where
low severities could be combined into sufficiently serious harms.
The first possibility, that probabilities might be summed, seems more intu-
itive. Indeed, such an approach would be highly similar to that of the D.C. Circuit
in NRDC: individuals with slight personal risks of harm could band together, and
once the aggregate risk reaches a key threshold,53 the claim would be granted
standing. Examples of such "low probability" harms abound, but the most salient
appear in areas like health policy,54 safety regulation,55 and climate change.56 It
is in precisely these areas where one might imagine an individual has not suffered
enough harm to be counted as injured, but a population might.5 7
The second possibility, of course, would be for courts to combine the sums
of intensities. For example, one might argue that the harm of knowing the Na-
tional Security Agency could be illegitimately spying on you is comparatively
low (when compared with, say, cancer). Yet, should a sufficiently large group of
individuals experience this harm, and should their experiences be aggregated, the
harm would eventually obtain the status of a standing-worthy injury.
Whichever route is pursued, the court's analysis would be comparable: first,
a group or class of individuals would come forward citing a common harm. This
group could be an association, such as the NRDC. More ambitiously, the group
might be an ad hoc association of individuals banding together solely for litiga-
tion purposes, in what would amount to a sort of "class action standing."5 While
52. E.g., Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Because the evaluation
of risk is qualitative, the probability of harm which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to allege a cog-
nizable injury-in-fact logically varies with the severity of the probable harm."). See generally Nash, supra
note 8.
53. Of course, the question of where such a threshold should be set would, itself, be
challenging. For one possibility, see Mank, supra note 44, at 665, which proposes a one in -a million
threshold for treating risk of death as an injury.
54. Craig, supra note 41.
55. Leiter, supra note 48.
56. David R. Hodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can Anyone Complain About the
Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451 (2000).
57. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Comment, Risk Magnified: Standing Under the Statist Lens,
112 YALE L.J. 1633 (2003).
58. While beyond the scope of this work, a full comparison between the proposed con-
cept of "class standing" and the current device of "class action" appears to be of considerable interest.
Intuitively, the two devices appear to have many important similarities. Structurally, both aim at aggre-
gating harms that, if pursued individually, would be non-viable: in the "class standing" context, harms
that could not legally be recognized on an individual basis would be able to receive court redress. Simi-
larly, in the traditional "class action" context, harms that could notpractically be pursued on an individual
basis (usually because the individual damages are only a few dollars) are able to receive court redress.
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 29, at 21. Likewise, as discussed in greater detail in Part ll.B.3.d, both devices
would require systems to effectively ensure that one lawyer can adequately "represent" each of the hun-
dreds or thousands of litigants united before the court. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE
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this concept initially seems novel, at least some "associations" that have been
granted standing in the past were formed for the sole purpose of a particular law-
suit, which suggests that such a route is already viable.
59
In any case, once the fractional group has launched its challenge, the judge
would aggregate the individual "fractional" harms to determine if, when com-
bined, the sum total justified standing. This is not to say that such an action would
be a "mechanical" multiplication exercise; indeed, given the amorphous nature
of concepts like "injury," such quantifiable rigor could seldom be expected.6"
Yet, just as precepts like the "Hand Rule" employ the language of mathematics
to set a rough heuristic in tort law (even if in practice it is seldom applied with
full mathematical rigor), fractional standing would provide a qualitative lens for
jurists to approach complex problems of court access.61
When will aggregated injuries be substantial enough to justify review?
What would this "calculus" look like in practice? The simplest approach would
be to set a quantitative bar based on how many "whole" injuries have been ex-
perienced. That is, if four persons have each suffered a harm equal to "one-
fourth" of a standing-worthy claim, then once their harms are combined, standing
would be justified.62
(2009). Perhaps a more resonant similarity, however, is that both class action and class standing have thus
far been products not of intentional legislative design but of ad hoc, judge-led innovations. See
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 29, at 32-35 (discussing the gradual development of class actions from the Eng-
lish common law courts of equity to the American court system). In the case of traditional class action, in
time these judge-created devices were recognized and incorporated into formal rules of procedure, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, a fate "class standing" may someday share. This shared origin is largely unsurprising,
since both devices reflect the need to adjust our "adversarial" legal system, which was built to address
discrete, person-on-person injuries, to meet the more complex demands of modem industrial society
(where a single entity can simultaneously injure millions). That said, despite these similarities, there are
also important differences. In particular, traditional class action still emphatically requires that the "class
representative" have received an actual "injury in fact," that is, that the injury binary is satisfied.
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 29, at 58-59 (noting that the class representative must at all times maintain indi-
vidual injury standing under the standards set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
As a result, "class standing" would represent an important evolution from the current device of class ac-
tion.
59. In the classic example, the Supreme Court granted standing to Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), an "unincorporated association formed by five law students to
enhance the quality of the environment," which had apparently formed exclusively to launch legal chal-
lenges against various railroad regulations. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 670 (1973).
60. Fletcher, supra note 31, at 280 ('Injury in fact' may appear to be a neutral factual
concept. But it is not. It is a normative concept. If we put people who lie to one side, it is apparent that
anyone who feels himself or herself to be injured is, in fact, injured. We may not ourselves feel injured in
the same situation. We may not choose to recognize someone's injury as entitling that person to protection
or compensation.").
61. Of course, unlike the "Hand Rule," where judges must perform a rough cost-benefit
analysis to determine the outcome, the heuristic here would turn on some combination of the probability
of the harm and the severity of the harm.
62. And, of course, if a ratio of one-to-one is seen as setting the bar "too low," a more
stringent ratio could be employed instead. For example, courts might, for prudential reasons, decline to
grant fractional standing unless the equivalent of two (or ten) standing-worthy injuries had been experi-
enced.
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Notably, this "quantitative" approach need not be limited solely to fields
we generally associate with mathematical precision, such as environmental reg-
ulations.63 Consider, for instance, two prominent constitutional rulings on police
practices. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,64 the Supreme Court held a litigant
who had suffered a police chokehold lacked standing to sue for injunctive relief.
The Court reached this conclusion because Lyons, the victim, could not establish,
with sufficient certainty, that he would personally face a police chokehold
again.65 By contrast, in Floyd v. City of New York66 (litigation challenging New
York's stop-and-frisk police search policy), the court took a different turn. Spe-
cifically, the presiding judge distinguished Lyons on the grounds that the proba-
bility that each individual plaintiff would, once again, be stopped-and-frisked
was substantially greater than the probabilities at issue in Lyons.67 On these
grounds, she recognized the plaintiffs' standing. In these sorts of cases, fractional
standing would essentially function to convert a Lyons-type claim into a Floyd-
type claim: that is, had multiple plaintiffs in Lyons's position banded together,
at a certain point the probability that at least one of them would, at some point,
face a chokehold, would reach the critical probability identified in cases like
Floyd, such that standing would be appropriate.
Of course, even such a loose approach to "quantitative" methodology might
prove unwieldy in certain cases, such as for harms like the invasion of privacy-
harms that do not lend themselves to ready quantification. Here, though, other
approaches are possible. For example, courts might base their reasoning on
whether a substantial portion of a relevant population has been impacted. Thus,
in a case like Clapper, a court might ask if the parties alleging the harm of sur-
veillance comprise a substantial portion of the pool of citizens that engage in
communications with foreigners suspected of terrorist activities. The answer to
this inquiry, in turn, could shape the extent to which the grievance could merit
access to legal redress. As yet another alternative, courts might look to the diver-
sity and distribution of the plaintiffs assembled: to the extent that a given "frac-
tional injury" is experienced by individuals in different parts of the country or in
varied contexts, a grant of standing might become more appropriate.
This basic outline, to be sure, leaves much unresolved, such as which pre-
cise harms should be "fractional," which harms should be "full injuries," and
which harms do not merit standing at all. Yet for now, this sketch in sufficient to
see some of the advantages that fractional standing might offer.
63. As were at issue in NRDC v. EPA. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
64. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
65. Id. at 105-06.
66. 283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
67. See id. at 170 (distinguishing Lyons on the grounds that, inter alia, the frequency of
alleged injuries inflicted by the practices at issue here creates a likelihood of future injury sufficient to
address any standing concerns).
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2. Fractional Standing and the Judicial Role
With this background in mind, we may turn to consider how fractional
standing would interact with the core purposes of the injury standing doctrine's
injury requirement: ensuring efficacious legal advocacy, allocating scarce judi-
cial resources, defending the separation of powers, and ensuring justice for liti-
gants. On each count, fractional standing emerges as superior to the current bi-
nary regime.
a. Effective Legal Advocacy
The first functional justification for the injury requirement is the desire for
high-quality litigation to determine legal questions. Specifically, two mecha-
nisms have been suggested: (1) that actually injured parties offer more vigorous
and skilled arguments,68 and (2) that judges decide more competently when as-
sessing harms that are manifest in the real world, as opposed to completing hy-
pothetical exercises.69 Under either theory, fractional standing would offer con-
structive benefits.
The first premise of the "legal advocacy" argument is the belief that parties
who are themselves injured are more apt to vigorously contest a legal question,
and thus to bring courts the highest quality arguments to assess. Of course, this
correlation is far from perfect. After all, even without any injured members, a
sincerely concerned legal interest group would almost surely offer sufficiently
"sharp" legal advocacy.70 Conversely, actually injured victims may be wholly
unprepared to argue a complex legal question. Nevertheless, this principle con-
tinues to capture an important intuition that animates standing doctrine: all else
equal, it is in a court's interest to have a motivated and focused presentation of
the issues.
Fractional standing enhances these values. First, by favoring large groups
of plaintiffs over small groups of plaintiffs, it ensures that those litigants who do
reach court are more likely to be the group or groups most aggrieved by the harm
at issue. Indirectly, it also promotes a higher quality of advocacy, since organi-
zations that are able to coordinate large groups of stakeholders are also more
likely to have the resources to litigate effectively.
The second premise of the "legal advocacy" argument is the assumption
that judges are more competent at resolving disputes once they have manifested
68. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
70. Siegel, supra note 21, at 88-89 ("[lI]t is hard to doubt that the Sierra Club or Amer-
icans United for Separation of Church and State would have sufficiently illuminated the merits of issues
presented in the landmark cases in which they were held to lack standing."). Perhaps recognizing this fact,
the United Kingdom has recently authorized organizations with no actually injured members to have
standing in environmental suits, provided they are sufficiently ideologically committed to the litigation.
See Owens, supra note 22, at 343-47.
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in the real world. In fairness, judges around the world have engaged in abstract
review for decades, casting this claim into doubt. Yet even if this is viewed as an
important concern, there does not seem to be any analytical reason to believe that
fractional injuries are not "real," or that judges cannot analyze their impact on
the world (as when real ozone depletion is causing a real aggregation of cancer
risk).
Thus, insofar as providing high-quality advocacy is concerned, fractional
standing appears to offer no drawback to the status quo-instead, it suggests sev-
eral benefits.
b. Marshaling Scarce Judicial Resources
The second key justification for the injury requirement is that it ensures that
scarce judicial resources are allocated to the most pressing problems. Under this
theory, limiting court access to the truly "injured" is essential, since otherwise
courts would face "floodgates" of litigation that would swamp them and reduce
decision quality.
71
Fractional standing would serve a key role in helping to allocate judicial
resources. First, by maintaining the status quo "binary" in the many contexts
where it works well,72 courts could ensure that fractional disputes only reach
them once they have achieved a certain degree of seriousness. Moreover, aggre-
gation would serve as a powerful source of information for courts, as it would
indicate when a "low probability" or "low intensity" harm had achieved legally
cognizable dimensions. Finally, the rise of class standing might give plaintiffs
with "borderline" claims an incentive to consolidate their focus into one action,
rather than each bring myriad separate legal claims, netting a potentially im-
portant savings of legal resources.
c. Preserving the Separation of Powers
Perhaps the most serious challenge to fractional standing stems from the
ideal of separation of powers. As noted above, proponents of the separation of
powers argue that, because the judiciary is less democratically accountable than
other branches of government, its powers must be carefully constrained. Stand-
ing, on this account, serves the vital role of ensuring that a court does not become
a roving "Council of Revisions"73 with the discretion to review any law at will,
71. Robert Terenzi Jr., Note, When Cows Fly: Expanding Cognizable Injury-in-Fact
andInterest Group Litigation, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1559, 1597 (2009). For a critical view of the "flood-
gates" argument, see Manin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007 (2013).
72. See supra Part II.B. 1.
73. Notably, Originalists contend that the Founders' rejection of a council of revisions
approach is yet another justification for adopting a constrained concept of standing. See, e.g., Konto-
rovich, supra note 11, at 1674.
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but rather is limited to addressing a (relatively) small set of legally recognized
grievances.
Initially, the separation of powers perspective seems quite hostile to the
fractional standing approach. After all, if a court is empowered to recognize new
forms of "fractional harm," this would seem to increase its influence and ambit
at the expense of the other branches of government.
More subtly, as fractional standing will involve large classes of plaintiffs,
it runs into a familiar argument: if there is, indeed, a broadly shared sense of
grievance, the proper venue to express this hurt is the legislature, not the courts.
Under this argument, the very fact that a large fractional class has aggregated
would count against it.
Even if one accepts the separation of powers framework, however, frac-
tional standing actually enhances this balance by addressing a fundamental pa-
thology of democracy. By their nature, fractional harms are often of the sort that
ordinary democratic processes fail to redress. After all, a classic vice of modern
democracy is that a small but motivated minority can prevail over a large but
only indirectly affected majority.74 Regulation that increases cancer risks is a
good example of this: industry groups might spend millions to lobby the govern-
ment for a lower ozone standard, while citizens who suffer a one-in-a-million
increased chance of cancer are unlikely to march on Capitol Hill. While such
dynamics are a recurring feature of democracies, they are particularly likely to
present concurrently with fractional harm: low intensity or low probability harms
spread out across the population. Thus, the addition of fractional standing could
play a key role in helping our system's separation of powers to function more
effectively.
Of course, there remains the argument that, if misused, fractional standing
could abet judicial abuses of power. For example, one might imagine a capricious
judge who uses the concept of fractional harm to permit standing for plaintiffs
based solely on the judge's biases. To wit, a pro-environmental judge might con-
sider ecological concern fractional in order to create a "back door" to court access
for otherwise meritless claims.
There is no doubt that, if abused, fractional standing precepts could allow
inappropriate judicial actions. Yet the same could be said about any number of
judicial practices, most notably, the current standing doctrine itself.7 5 Indeed,
should a judge desire to subvert standing doctrine, the doctrine's current malle-
ability and indeterminacy would seem to permit it.
76
74. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1-18 (1963) (discussing the advantages small groups facing concentrated harms
from a given change have in political conflicts with large groups where the individual benefit to each from
that change is small); see also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-44 (1991).
75. Fletcher, supra note 31, at 280.
76. Staudt, supra note 10, at 615-16.
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Accordingly, the question is not whether fractional standing might be used
inappropriately, but whether it has a greater risk of inappropriate use than the
status quo. And through this lens, it is unclear why the concept of fractional harm
would be any more susceptible to judicial manipulation than current standing
doctrine.
d. Dispensing Justice
Finally, at the same time as our standing doctrine aims to satisfy the three
criteria outlined above, it also seeks to ensure that those who have been truly
injured have a path to redress. Over the past forty years, the priority this value
has been given has waxed and waned, with broad standing rules embraced in the
Warren Court era,77 and narrower rules prevailing in later years.78 Yet as recent
rulings like Massachusetts v. EPA attest, standing doctrine does constantly seek
to recognize and redress injustice, even if it requires evolution and recognition
of new harms.
79
Fractional standing would allow courts to far better fulfill their role in re-
dressing legal wrongs. First, and most obviously, fractional standing would per-
mit many injured individuals to, for the first time, receive justice. If one believes
that an increased risk of cancer or the chilling effect of government surveillance
are harms, then it is a good thing that these harms can be redressed.
Moreover, by acknowledging the existence of harms that do not individu-
ally rise to the status of injury, courts could more accurately represent he nature
of harm and wrong. Society has always recognizcd classes of activity that are
harmful precisely because they are repeated across multiple instances. Thus cer-
tain crimes, like the offense of stalking, are criminal solely because they form
repeated patterns.80 Likewise, certain indignities, such as being exposed to trace
cigarette smoke, are generally deemed harmless individually, but can become
violations of legal norms if such exposure becomes a pattern.8' Current standing
jurisprudence, however, does not adequately recognize this longstanding princi-
ple. Fractional standing would thus serve as a powerful tool for recognizing that
there are, indeed, phenomena which are greater than the sum of their parts, in
which individually innocuous components of a harm-such as carbon dioxide
77. See Steams, supra note 10, at 875 (noting that the Warren Court worked to "broaden
standing").
78. Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question
Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 304 (1996) (collecting cases to conclude that "[s]ince the mid- 1970s...
the Court's attitude toward the standing doctrine has been increasingly restrictive").
79. Such as, in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA, the distinctive harms caused by world-
wide climate change. 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007).
80. E.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-1(1) (2006) (defining the crime of stalking as
when persons "[w]illfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass another person") (emphasis
added).
81. See Irene Scharf, Breathe Deeply: The Tort of Smokers' Battery, 32 HoUS. L. REV.
615 (1995).
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emission82 or the positioning of a particular security camera83-- can add up to a
legally cognizable and justiciable wrong.
Finally, introducing the concept of fractional harms would provide judges
with the flexibility to take tentative steps toward addressing novel and evolving
phenomena: rather than simply declaring a given event "injurious" or "not inju-
rious," courts could take the more cautious, middle path of granting fractional
standing. This option, in turn, would allow courts to better refine and develop
their doctrines around new and changing events.
In sum, fractional standing would allow new and more refined paths to j us-
tice by recognizing previously unaddressed harms, by candidly embracing the
cumulative nature of some harms, and by giving judges a key tool to explore and
develop new doctrines of injury.
3. Objections Considered
As the above analysis indicates, fractional standing would go a long way
toward accomplishing the core aims of standing doctrine's injury requirement.
Yet, before concluding that courts should recognize fractional injury, several im-
portant objections must be weighed and considered.
a. Judicial Competence
One argument against the recognition of fractional standing stems from
questions of court competence. To date, many have noted that courts can struggle
with assessing low probability harms because complex mathematics are beyond
the ken of typical jurists.84 Relatedly, given the potential complexities of "prob-
ability pleadings,"85 one might fear higher administrative costs and challenges as
courts struggle to sift through such complex, "polycentric" calculations.8 6
As an initial response, the methodology proposed in this Note would often
be relatively simple to apply. In the case of fractional risks of harm, for example,
it would be as simple as basic multiplication. Indeed, courts are already trusted
to engage in such probabilistic thinking in a variety of contexts. As Jonathan
82. E.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992).
83. Not coincidentally, such a perspective is linked to the emerging notion of a "mosaic
theory" of government tracking, in which individually appropriate devices (such as government cameras),
may, through sheer aggregation, transform into an unconstitutional degree of constant citizen monitoring,
even if each individual camera was appropriate. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered
Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013).
84. See Lee, supra note 45, at 416-17 (highlighting the technical challenges facing
judges who attempt to address harms based on small probabilities).
85. My thanks to Mark Jia for suggesting this argument.
86. For the classic argument that courts are ill-equipped to engage in such complex,
"polycentric" problem solving, see Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth 1. Winston, The Forms and Limits ofAdu-
dication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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Remy Nash notes, courts already make probabilistic judgments in areas includ-
ing determining when to grant bail and at what level (accounting for the proba-
bility of recidivism or escape), deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction
(accounting for the probability of threatened future harm), and discerning when
an election has an "intolerable" probability of being infected with bias.87 Addi-
tionally, courts like the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals often have extensive ex-
perience with probabilistic harms in technical fields like health, environmental
and industrial regulation.
88
The more fundamental point, however, is that, despite its name, fractional
standing refers as much to a general frame of mind as to a particular mathemati-
cal calculation. Judges today are already entrusted to weigh when an indignity
becomes an "injury," a task that involves far more philosophy than mathematics.
In the same way, fractional injury would often be used less as a precise numerical
ratio and more as a general, qualitative precept: that the number of those harmed
should matter in deciding whether court access is merited. Weighing the appli-
cation of such a qualitative heuristic will not always be easy, but it is the sort of
task that is well within what we already demand of the judiciary.
b. Bias Toward Large Organizations
A second objection stems from the possibility that a fractional standing sys-
tem would unduly advantage large and established organizations. Such an argu-
ment could take one of two forms. First, and most obviously, a large organization
would simply be more likely to have the numbers to obtain standing. To return
to the NRDC example, if the rate of cancer were truly one in a million, and if one
set the "injury" bar at a single projected cancer, then there would only be a few
organizations whose membership could clear this bar.8 9 Second, a more nuanced
critique would suggest that in complex, "probabilistic" cases, establishing frac-
tional standing might demand the services of experts like statisticians, public
health specialists, and others who could establish the "fraction" of harm imposed
on each person, a burden smaller groups might find difficult to bear.
90
Fortunately, such concerns are less severe than they might seem. First, it is
important to remember that in the status quo, large organizations already enjoy
immense advantages in securing standing, since they are far more likely to have
87. See Nash, supra note 8, at 1316-17.
88. See generally Patricia M. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of
Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1981) (noting that, for the D.C. Circuit, "[t]he staples of
our diet are the legal sides of the most complicated scientific, economic, social, and even political issues
of our day; issues that affect the quality of our nation's life-the air we breathe; the water we drink; the
price we pay for fuel, medicine, telephone calls, and political campaigns").
89. A fact at least some commentators have recognized. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 44,
at 722-23.
90. E.g., Leiter, supra note 48, at 415 (noting that, in a related context, establishing
probability "may necessitate conducting extensive interviews, preparing myriad affidavits, hiring statisti-
cal experts, and perhaps even developing new statistical models").
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a member who has been "injured." Thus, any marginal change that would follow
from the rise of fractional standing seems minimal.
Second, even as fractional standing opens the door for large associations, it
also explicitly recognizes a way for individuals to circumvent organizations en-
tirely through "class standing." As suggested earlier, a court that embraced frac-
tional injury would be more willing to accept ad hoc groups of litigants whose
only connective bond is the harm they allege. The creation of such a class would
allow for aggrieved individuals to potentially circumvent asserting claims
through organizations altogether, thus weakening the power and influence of es-
tablished groups.
Finally, even if one believes that large organizations would be advantaged
by a fractional standing system, this may well be a positive outcome. As noted
above, one of the main goals of the injury requirement of standing doctrine is to
ensure that legal issues are argued as well and comprehensively as possible. In-
deed, at least one scholar has suggested that a core concern of modem standing
doctrine is (and should be) "relative standing"--that is, the selection of the rela-
tively superior plaintiff to advance a given cause.91 Seen in this light, a system
that makes it more likely that large and established organizations will advocate
for legal positions is a "feature, not a bug," as it helps ensure high-quality advo-
cacy.
92
c. Problems of Representation
A final potential objection to fractional standing stems from problems pre-
sented by representation. As in other group litigation contexts, such as the class
action setting, there is the possibility that an aggregated group might deny indi-
viduals their due, particularly if the strategy chosen by the group (or its leaders)
differs from the members' individual preferences. For example, an individual
who has experienced a cancer risk and who has joined in a fractional litigation
might personally prefer a strategy of total attack against an agency. Yet, once
standing is granted, it is possible that the class as a whole (via their lawyer and!
or class representative) will instead argue for a more conciliatory settlement.
Thus, true representation is denied.
There is no doubt that such problems of representation are serious. Yet, just
as courts were able to fashion checks for other aggregate litigation, such as class
actions,93 there is no reason why similar checks would not arise here over time.
Perhaps most importantly, it is vital to remember that cases brought via
fractional standing are those, which, in the status quo, could not be brought at
91. Re, supra note 33, at 1195-96.
92. This has been recognized by democracies like the United Kingdom in their relatively
broad grant of standing to well-established advocacy organizations as opposed to less experienced groups.
See supra note 70.
93. Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 220 (1992).
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all. Accordingly, while the representation that fractional standing offers to ag-
grieved individuals may sometimes be imperfect, it seems clearly superior to the
alternative of receiving no hearing at all.
1II. Conclusion
Evolution is never easy, but as we choose how to allocate court access, it is
vital that our system match the realities of our courts' current role and further our
aspirations regarding the role they ought to have. Binary standing is a deeply
intuitive concept. It is precisely because it is intuitive that it has remained un-
challenged for so long. Yet the core purposes of standing doctrine-and the true
nature of harm and injury--each suggest a change is in order. Against this back-
drop, the recognition of fractional standing would allow courts to better fulfill
their role within our democracy.

